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"Experience made him sage"
-John Gay'
To Roscoe Pound was given an invaluable experience rarely
granted to a legal philosopher and teacher, 2 the experience afforded by a
position upon a judicial tribunal of high rank. In April i9oi the
Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska, then consisting of a chief justice and two judges,3 found itself confronted with a docket hopelessly
in arrears. The legislature, coming to the aid of the court, created the
Nebraska Supreme Court Commission.4

Nine commissioners were

appointed by unanimous vote of the supreme court to prepare and
submit opinions in over fifteen hundred cases which had accumulated
in the court. The commissioners were organized into three "departments" each consisting of three members, one of whom served as
chairman of his department.
Appointed as one of the original commissioners, Roscoe Pound,
was assigned to the "Second Department". 5 During Pound's tenure
as a commissioner, the members of the supreme court itself wrote
almost no opinions. As the (locket was called, the cases were assigned
equally to the departments and the chairman of each department reassigned these cases to its members. There followed the usual hearing,
t A. B., 1927, University of Iowa; LL. B., 1933, Yale University; J. S. D., 1934,
Cornell University; Professor of Law, Georgetown University; author of Aludminum
and Monopoly: A Phase of an Uisolved Problem (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 509;
Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present Relief and Future Policy (1938) 23 CORN. L.
Q. 365; Provisional Arrest and Detention in International Extraditio (1934) 23
GEO. L. J. 37 and other articles in various legal periodicals.
i. THE SHEPHERD AND THE PBILOSoPHER.

2. It is an experience such as few of the prolific neo-realist legal philosopherteachers have been able to claim. With the exception of Jerome Frank, who has had
a valuable experience in active practice and in administrative office, and Judge Joseph

C. Hutcheson, the experience of most of them has been almost entirely academic.
3. T. L. Norval, Chief Justice, J. J. Sullivan and Silas A. Holcomb, judges.
4. Neb. Ses. Laws, 1901, c. 25: p. 331. "No person shall be appointed as such
Commissioner who is not a practicing lawyer in good standing, possessing the qualifications required for the office of Judge of the Supreme Court of this State, and none
of said Commissioners shall practice law while holding such position." 2 NMa. ANN.
STAT. (Cobbey, 1903) § 4727.

5. With him were Samuel H. Sedgwick as chairman and Willis D. Oldham.
Letter to the author from William G. Hastings (appointed a commissioner for the
first department simultaneously with Pound's appointment to the second department,
successor to Pound as Dean of the College of Law in the University of Nebraska,
and for a considerable period until some five years ago, judge of the District Court of
Nebraska for the fourth (Omaha) district). See also 61 Neb. iii (igoi).
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orally and by brief, before the department," the consultation by its
members, and the selection of one of their number by the chairman to
write the opinion. Each opinion was brought before the department
and, if approved, it was submitted to the supreme court. If the court
was satisfied with the result and the reasons supporting it, the opinion
was accepted and the case was so decided. On the other hand, if the
judges, or any of them, disapproved of either the result or of the
rationale upon which the result was founded, the opinion with their
7
objection was returned and a new opinion was prepared.
Of Thomas McIntyre Cooley it has been said, "he was a great
judge but with only the opportunities afforded by a state tribunal". 8
With equal truth, this may be said of Roscoe Pound. From the date
of his appointment as a supreme court commissioner in April 19oi
until his resignation from the commission in the winter of 19o3, Pound
wrote one hundred and three opinions, of which twenty-two were in
reversal of judgments in the courts below and four in modification of
their judgments. 9 The opportunities which the supreme tribunal of
the state of Nebraska, as it existed at the turn of the century, afforded
to a creative jurist were scarcely adequate to reveal his potential
6. Each of the departments would dispose of approximately twelve cases per
week. Letter to the author from William G. Hastings (commissioner of first department).
7. By the spring of 1904 the accumulated cases were out of the way and the
commission of nine members was discharged and a new one of only three commissioners established. Letter of William G. Hastings to the author. Since that time
the membership of the Supreme Court of Nebraska has been increased to seven members, a chief justice and six associates. NEB. ComP. STAT. (1922) § io66.
8. The following judgment upon Cooley as a judge is quoted at length because,
on the basis of a complete reading of Pound's opinions, the statements with regard to
judicial attitude and inherent limitations enforced by the tribunal of the time and
place and the questions before it, might be with equal truth applied to Roscoe Pound,
niutatis mzutandis: "He [Cooley] was a great judge, as were his associates. He was
a great judge with only the opportunities afforded by a state tribunal. Whatever
he did in this field he did thoroughly well. But his chief title to distinction lay in
his ability as an expounder of constitutional questions, and this he exercised as an
author more largely than as a judge. Could he have had the opportunities that
Marshall had, such was his grasp upon fundamental principles and such his ability for
logical, forceful and exact statement that he would undoubtedly have been the equal of
Marshall upon the bench. It is, however, with Judge Cooley as he was upon the
bench and not as he might have been, that we have to deal. And it is no exaggeration
to say that he was the ideal judge. He combined in a rare way the qualities that go
to make up the judicial temperament. No one who appeared before him could forget
the careful and painstaking attention with which he followed the argument of counsel.
He was pre-eminently a good listener, and one always felt that his occasional questions were a positive aid in the development of the subject under discussion. He
moreover always gave the impression that he was bringing to the consideration of the
case his best thought and judgment. No one ever detected in him the slightest tinge
of prejudice. He always preserved the judicial attitude." Hutchins, Tlwmias McIntyre Cooley in 7 LEwis, GREAT AmmANIC LAWYERS (909) 431, 458.
9. These are found in volumes 6i to 69 inclusive of the Nebraska State Reports.
See Cassidy, Dean Pound: The Scope of His Life and Work (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L.
Q. REv. 897, 9io, where the number of opinions 'written by Pound is erroneously given
as ninty-mne.
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genius. 10 Much of the litigation then in the court was concerned with
comparatively simple questions of property law which required only
the application of a fixed rule to accomplish adequate justice." The
tribunal of which Pound was a member represented a state which, compared to its eastern sisters, was sparsely settled. Nebraska then was
decidedly an agricultural community and the legacy of the pioneer was
still everywhere in evidence.' 2
Despite the inevitable limitations which characterized the justiciable questions before the tribunal at that time and in that place, an
examination of the opinions written by Roscoe Pound affords an interesting and profitable insight into the evolution of his juristic creed.
Even though Pound had not labored under the limitation of comparatively unimportant controversies, one should scarcely expect to find
in any of these opinions, or in their aggregate, any full-blown statement
of Poundian philosophy as it is known today. We are to remember that
it was approximately a decade after Pound left the bench before he
prepared a reasonably adequate statement of the scope and purpose
of his juristic creed.' 3 But that the controlling attitudes, if not the
formulated principles, of that creed were already operative during
Pound's career on the bend seems eloquently argued from the fact
that immediately upon leaving judicial office, on the occasion of his
inaugural as Dean of the College of Law at the University of Nebraska,
he described in some detail the hopes and aspirations of his "new
school of jurists".' 4 It is significant to note that it was neither the
years of teaching, nor the protracted reflections of a scholar that
prompted the first call, but rather, it was prompted by the stern practicalities of adjudicating controversies in a court of law. How much
of Pound's philosophy is to be found expressed or applied in his judicial
IO. Cf. Cassidy's estimate: "Lawyers who have long admired cogency and lucidity
of the style of Mr. Justice Holmes and of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, will discover
here opinions which are models of form and substance, of comprehensiveness and
brevity." Ibid. The opinions are "cogent" and carefully prepared but, taken as a
whole, it is somewhat extravagant to class them with the opinions of either Holmes
or Shaw. To say this is not to say that, given the materials, Pound might not have
produced opinions equal to those of Holmes and Shaw. It is, however, too much to
expect that statues of fine marble be chiseled from inferior clay.
ii. The wholly adequate justice which Pound seems to attain in the property
disputes which came before this court appears to argue eloquently the desirability and
the efficacy of his certainty by rule technique in disposing of property questions.
12. In 1goo the population of Nebraska was preponderantly rural, more than twothirds of the people being farm-dwellers. CENsus OF 19oo.
13. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudei e (1911) 24
HAgv.L. REy. 591, (1911) 25 id. at 140, (1912) 25 id. at 489.
14. Pound, A New School of Jurists, 4 U. OF NEB. STUDiEs (1904) No. 3. See
also Pound, Da We Need a Philosophy of Law? (19o5) 5 COL. L. REV. 339; The
Need of a Sociological Jurisprudenwe (9o7) 19 GREEN BAG 607; (1907) 31 A. B. A.
REP. 911.
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opinions? :' For the answer we look first to his juristic philosophy
1
and then to the opinions themselves. '
I. THE POUNDIAN PHILOSOPHY
The basic aim in the juristic philosophy of Roscoe Pound appears
17
to be the balancing of security of society and the individual life.
Viewing a developed body of legal precepts, which seem to be the most
common instruments used in striking the balance thought to be desirable, Pound finds two characteristic elements, an imperative
18
(enacted) element and a traditional (habitual or customary) element.
Of course, these elements cannot be separated into mutually exclusive
categories at any particular time or place. There is constant interplay
between them, the traditional element becoming imperative through the
transforming medium of legislation, and the imperative being incorporated into the body of the common law through the transforming
medium of judicial decision. Coming to the more all-embracing view
of jurisprudence, the philosophical jurist has long insisted upon a third
element in law, the ideal element. Pound has defined it as a body of
received ideals "of the end of law, and hence of what legal precepts
should be and how they should be applied. .

.

."

1

In the nineteenth

century the significant question was which of these three elements commanded an exclusive significance. From Pound comes the comforting
answer that all three are significant and that no adequate discussion of
basic juristic problems is possible unless account be taken of the precept element, the traditional element (which in practice amounts to the
traditional art of the lawyer's craft-the authoritative traditional tech15. "Pound was only thirty-three when he left the Commission and I doubt if
he had then developed a philosophy of law. He was already interested in legal history, but I think he rather avoided putting it much into his opinions; for at that time
and place it was not advisable to be known as a 'high-brow'." Letter to the author
from Charles Sumner Lobingier, Esq., who served as a commissioner of the Supreme
Court of Nebraska during 19o2 and 19o3. In a conversation with the writer, the late
Professor Edwin H. Woodruff reported the late Frank Irvine, who was a supreme
court commissioner in Nebraska from 1893 to 1899, as holding an opinion substantially similar to Judge Lobingier's.
16. Cassidy says: "Seven opinions may be noted as illustrative of the whole." He
then proceeds to discuss six of them. It is difficult to understand just why these were
singled out for discussion. They are interesting cases on their facts but they do not
represent Pound's best technique. Indeed, if they are intended to serve as illustrations for the extravagant claim with reference to Pound's place as a judge beside
Holmes and Lord Shaw, they shoot wide of the mark. If six (or seven) cases were
to be discussed as illustrative, certainly a more fortunate selection out of the onehundred and three could have been made. Cassidy, Dean Pound: The Scope of His
Life and Work (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 897, 910-914. For a complete table of
Pound's opinions see Appendix, p. 327 infra.

X7. Pound, A Theory of Social Interests (1920) 15 Am. SocioL. Soc. PUB. 16, 17.
I8. POuND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) 173-175.
ig. Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision (1931) 45
HAzv. L. REv. 136, 147-148. See also Pound, The Ideal and the Actual in LawForty Years After (1933) I GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 431, 437.
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nique of finding the grounds of decision in the mass of precepts), and
the body of received ideals with regard to the end and purpose to be
served by the legal order.
In dealing with the precept element in law, Roscoe Pound has
analyzed and classified the varied types of legal precepts as follows:
i. Rules (in the narrower sense)-precepts attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed factual situation.
2. Principles-authoritative points of departure for legal reasoning, employed continually and legitimately where cases are not
covered or are not fully or obviously covered by rules in the
narrower sense.
3. Conceptions-authoritative categories to which types or classes
of transactions, cases, or situations are referred, in consequence
of which a series of rules, principles and standards become
applicable.
4. Doctrines-systematic joining of rules, principles, and conceptions with respect to particular situations or types of cases or
fields of the legal order, in logically interdependent schemes,
whereby reasoning may proceed on the basis of the scheme and
its logical implications.
5. Standards-generallimits of permissible conduct to be applied
20
according to the circumstances of each case.
While in rules Pound finds "the bone and sinew of the legal order",2 1
it is through the standard that modern law chiefly realizes a desirable
individualization of application, particularly in the province of law
governing conduct and the control of enterprises.2 2 Such standards
are typified in the law of negligence by "the reasonable, prudent man";
in the field of public utilities by the standard of "reasonable service and
reasonable facilities"; in relations of trust by the "fair conduct" of
the fiduciary.
Examining the status of the ideal element in law, Dean Pound
finds that the first ideal of the legal order is the simple ideal of keeping
the peace. Successively the ideal of the legal order has been the maintaining of the social status quo (evolved by Greek philosophers), reversion to the ideal of keeping the peace (the Dark Ages), readoption
of the ideal of maintaining the social status (the Middle Ages), and
the ideal which prevailed through the nineteenth century, i. e., the ideal
of a maximum of free individual self-assertion as the greatest good
(Post-Reformation-Kantian). Today, we are told, that ideal is yield2o. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law (1933)

7 TULANE L. RV. 475, 482-486. The hierarchy (minus "doctrines") first appeared in
POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922)

115-120.

21. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systemts of Law (933)

TULANE L. REv. 475,
22. Id. at 485.

486.

7
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ing as a result of the persistent criticism of .received ideals by the
23
social-philosophical and sociological schools.

One of the attempts to formulate a new ideal as to the end of law
Pound finds in an endeavor to substitute an idea of cooperation for the
once dominant idea of free competition.2 4 Another attempt to formulate a new ideal lies in the conception of law in terms of social engineering. 2 5 - When Pound conceives of law as social engineering, he is
regarding law and its administration as a part of a much wider process
of social ordering, functioning through courts and administrative
agencies with the aid of legal precepts serving as partial guides. This
task of social ordering presupposes a sincere effort to avoid, or at least
to ameliorate, collisions resulting from the conflict of interests. All the
varied activities of the legal order-the efforts of courts, administrators, legislatures, jurists-are to be directed toward the adjustment
of relations, the compromise of conflicting claims, the securing of
interests by determining boundaries wherein each may be asserted with
a minimum of friction, and the finding of means whereby a greater
number of claims may be satisfied with a sacrifice of fewer. If law is
viewed as social engineering, its end is conceived to be the satisfaction of all demands and the securing of all interests with a minimum
of conflict so that the means of satisfaction may have the widest possible distribution.
A perplexing problem which has received much consideration from
Roscoe Pound is the relation of law and morals. 26 Sweeping through
history he finds that in the earliest stage (preceding lawyer's law) law
and morals were identified; when strict law (lawyer's law) became
dominant, law and morals were sharply differentiated. In the age
dominated by natural law and equity a standard of rationalistic
morality was made to comprehend not only conduct in general but the
formulated legal precept as well, whereas in the nineteenth century, an
age of legal maturity, law and morals were usually contrasted, the
dominant analytical jurist of the time contending that morals were
within the province of the legislator and outside the province of the
jurist. In the contemporary attitude of his own sociological school
23. Pound, Thw End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (914)

27 HARV.

L. R v. 605. See also Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Riles and Doc-

trines (914) 27 HAmv. L. REv. 195.
24. It was this ideal which seemed, in the main, to inspire the legislation of

N. R. A. days toward relaxation of the rigid operation of the anti-trust laws to
the end that cooperation rather than competition stood as the ideal to be encouraged.
See Reuschlein, Alumnimum and Moiopoly: A Phase of alp Unsolved Problem (ig39)
87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 509, 51, n. 9.
25. POUND, An Engineering Interpretation in INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HisTORY (1923) 141-165.
26. The attitudes of three traditional schools of jurisprudence, analytical, historical,
philosophical, is developed in his LAW AND MOR.ALs (2d ed. 1926).
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Pound finds much to suggest a revival of the natural law jurist's attitude with its attendant subordination of jurisprudence to ethics. The
desired relationship between morals and law he defines as a situation
wherein morals are regarded as an evaluation of interests and law as a
27
delimitation of interests in accordance with such a valuation.
But in this attitude is the fundamental weakness of Pound's creed.
For unless the immutability of certain principles is admitted, such as
the right to life and property-a philosophy results which is only half
moral, and that means immoral. It is perfectly possible to admit the
immutability of certain fixed principles and adjust our economy to
necessary changes; that is the happy and peculiar genius of "natural
law with a changing content." There is something faintly suggestive
of the Victorian compromise in Pound's unwillingness to admit the
complete identification of law with morals. Such a compromise as
Pound suggests is dangerous. Admittedly, it may not be dangerous
in Pound's own hands, but in the hands of men less scrupulous than
8
he and less deft than Holmes, the possibilities are alarming.
As suggested by Sir Henry Maine and Judge Dillon, Pound considers that "all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and of the need of change." 29
Out of such a conflict has come, to him, the particularly vital problem
of the province of rule and discretion. The traditional attitude of the
analytical school regarded justice according to law necessarily to mean
judicial justice according to formula.8 0 This attitude, supported by
the political dogma of the separation of powers, which the courts viewed
with sanctity, made for a stout antagonism toward any growth in
administrative justice. 8 1 To Pound, the problem of rule and discretion does not involve a rigid exclusion of one or the other from the
27. Pound's view of the relationship of law to morals is essentially that of John
F. Dillon who wrote: "Theoretically, and for many purposes practically, lawyers must
discriminate law from morality, and define and keep separate and distinct their respective provinces. But these provinces always adjoin each other; and ethical considerations
can no more be excluded from the administration of justice, which is the end and purpose of all civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live."
DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AmERICA (1895) 17.
28. Pound himself has given it that "Happily, men seldom practice exactly what
they preach. Yet what they preach has no little effect on what they practice."
POUND, CONTEMPORARY JuRisTic THEoRY (1940) 9. For an able development of the
thesis that complete identity of the legal with the moral, that certain broad absolutes
and immutables are basic to the security of democracy, see Lucey, Jurisprudence and
the Future Social Order (1941), 16 SocIAL ScIENCE 211, who says, at 216, "There is
no use talking about fundamental rights from a positivistic or pragmatic point of view
because there are no fundamentals or permanents, not to mention inalienables, where
there are no absolute values,--where the important of today can be the unimportant of
tomorrow."
29. "Law must be stable
OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) I.

and yet it cannot stand still,"

30. Pound, Justice According to Law (913)

POUND, INTERPRErATIONS

13 COL. L. REV. 696, (1914) 14 id. at

103.
31. It is an antagonism readily explicable in a polity which gloried in "a government of laws and not of men."
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legal system, but rather a recognition of the unique value of each;
judicial justice is restrained by authoritative legal precepts; administrative justice is potent with possibilities for individualization. 2 A
proper adjustment between the two types effects justice.
The question as to whether law is or ought to be certain, in whole
or in part, has provoked much heated discussion in recent years . 3
Pound divides the domain of the legal order into two zones. In the
one, certainty, which is attendant upon rules, will be the dominant
legal characteristic, while in the other discretion- and flexibility should
prevail. Certainty is held to be highly desirable and readily possible
in the fields of property law (inheritance and succession, interests in
property, conveyancing) and the law of commercial transactions, but
flexibility is indispensible in the field of law which deals with the more
intimate problems of human conduct (e. g. domestic relations, torts).
To substantiate his contention Pound cites the success with which
codes and uniform state laws have achieved their purpose in the law
of property, the law of succession, and commercial law; whereas they
have achieved little or nothing in the law of torts. Administrative
tribunals which have been constructed to individualize the application
of law deal with cases involving the moral quality of individual conduct in various enterprises rather than with matters of property and
commercial law.
The peculiar merit of Roscoe Pound's philosophy has been that
it pierced the nineteenth century discussion of rights to something far
more tangible and it has given us his celebrated theory of interests.3 4
Pound posed the question: why do men seek to enforce rights, if it is
not for the interests which are behind them? Under a jurisprudence
of conceptions, every right is like every other right; the infringement
of any one right no matter of how little substantial value it may be, is
as serious a matter as the infringement of any other right, since it
threatens to menace all rights. Such a method of reasoning originated
when there was real need for the security of individual rights from
the arbitrary interference of political power. It succeeded to a marked
degree in checking the designs of oppressive governments. Jhering,
than whom none was more hostile to a Begriffsjurisprudenz, nevertheless imposed a duty upon the party injured to assert his right, even
where, materially, it would not pay to do so. In defense of his right,
the individual defended the whole body of law, and thus contributed
32. The urge for individualization has been perhaps even more pronounced on the
Continent. So recent German Juristic writing abounds with discussion of Freie
Rechtsfindung.
33. See FRANK, LAw AND THE MODER MIND (1930) 207-216; 289-294.
34. See especially Pound, A Theory of Social Interests (192o) 15 Am. SoCIOL.

Soc. Puo

16.
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to the maintenance of social order.35 Jhering regarded individual rights
from the social standpoint; for him they were but a means whereby
society realizes its end. In this way Jhering paved the way for Pound's
theory of social interests.
Pound and Jhering agree that the sanction of a right lies not in
the right itself, but rather in what is behind the right, i. e., the interest
which gives rise to the social demand for the enforcement of the right.
It is important to note that social interest not only can dictate the
enforcement of a right, but it can also delimit or even abridge the
right. Whether the social interest demands enforcement or delimitation must depend upon the peculiar conditions of a particular society
at a given time and place. So viewed, it becomes the primary function
of law to guard the public against arbitrary action in the exercise of
power-whether that power be political, religious, cultural or economic.
The significant question is: where should the line be drawn between
the reasonable and the arbitrary exercise of power? Pound creates
this test: does it secure the greatest number of interests with the least
possible sacrifice of other interests?
In Pound's own words:
"An interest is a demand or desire which human beings
either individually or in groups seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the ordering of human relations civilized society must take
account.

"The law does not create interests. It classifies them and
recognizes a larger or smaller number; it defines the extent to
which it will give effect to those which it recognizes, in view of
(a) other interests, (b) the possibilities of effectively securing
them through law; it devises means for securing them when recognized and within the determined limits." So
He divides the interests which law is to secure into three groups: individual, public, social. An. outline of his tentative classification of
interests follows: 37
A. Individual Interests
i. Personality:
a. The physical person
b. Honor-Reputation
c. Privacy and sensibilities
d. Belief and opinion
2. Domestic Relations
35. JnERinG, THE SmUGGLE FOR LAW (Lalor's trans. 1879) 68-70.
36. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1928)

37. Id. at 61-69.

6o.
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3. Substance:
a. Property
Succession and testamentary disposition
b. Freedom of industry and contract
c. Promised advantages
d. Advantageous relation with others
(i)
(2)

Contractual
Social

(3) Business
(4) Official
(5) Domestic
"The Right of Association"
B. Public Interests
i. Interests of the state as a juristic person:
a. Personality
b. Substance
2. Interests of the state as guardian of social interests
C. Social Interests
i. General security:

2.

3.
4.

5.

a. Safety
b. Health
c. Peace and order
d. Security of transactions
e. Security of acquisitions
Security of Social Institutions:
a. Domestic
b. Religious
c. Political
d. Economic
General Morals
Conservation of social resources:
a. Use and conservation of natural resources
b. Protection and education of dependents and defectives
c. Reformation of delinquents
d. Protection of the economically dependent
General Progress:
a. Economic progress:
(i) Freedom of property from restrictions on sale or
use
(2) Free trade

(3) Free industry
(4) Encouragement of invention
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b. Political progress:
Free criticism
(2) Free opinion
c. Cultural progress:
(i) Free science
(2) Free letters
(3) Encouragement of arts and letters
(4) Encouragement of higher education
(5) Improvement of aesthetic surroundings
6. The Individual :Life
(i)

The significant aspect of these interests is that they have no fixed
values which are eternal and immutable. On the contrary, their values
are subject to change with time and place. Generally, each interest
might be said to rise and fall in value in direct proportion to the demand
of the time and place. The Poundian theory of interests seems unique
in that it is applicable to all types of situations, simple and complex.
Much of the merit of the theory lies in the fact that an emphasis of
one interest does not imply a neglect of the others. The theory of
social interests is not dogmatic in its pretentions; it admits the utility
of doctrines ancient and new, but it confines such doctrines to the
particular sphere in which they duly serve the social good. Under
this theory the ancient and oft-maligned doctrine of the natural rights
of man looms as the most effective tool to be employed in a country
where the chief interest, for the time being, to be secured is freedom,
political, religious or economic. But the difficulty is that the theory
of interest does not attach sufficient importance to the doctrine.
Every court, before it can make a final disposition of any controversy which may come before it, must weigh and balance social
interests. It seems clearly possible to state even individual interests in
terms of social interests. Pound observes that
"In weighing individual interests in view of the social interest in security of acquisitions and security of transactions, we
must take account of the social interest in the human life of each
individual, and so must restrict the legal enforcement of demands
to what is consistent with a human existence on the part of the
person subjected thereto." 88
As a pragmatist Pound came inevitably to study functionally the
limits of effective legal action. 9 Formerly, jurisprudence frequently
38. Pound, A Theory of Sociol Interests (1921) 15 Am. SocioL. SoC. PUR. 42-43.
39. Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action (1917) 27 INT. J. OF ETHICS
150, (1916) 22 PA. BAR Ass'" Ri:p. 221, especially 233 et seq. See also Pound, Law
in Books and Law in Action (I9]o) 44 Amf. L. REv. 12, (igog) PRoc. OF MD. BAR
Ass'N 298.
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fixed logical and philosophical limits to what law could be expected to
do effectively. Sociological jurists interest themselves in the practical
limitations upon the scope of law. They state that these limitations
inhere in the nature of our legal machinery and are not to be attributed
to logically imppsed or philosophically demonstrated barriers. Again
the Poundian faith in the efficacy of effort appears; we are told that
with improved legal machinery the limits of effective legal action may
be extended.40 But even after all is done that can be done to reform
procedure and set legal structure aright, much will remain which cannot
be done effectively through the legal process. Just what it is which
cannot be achieved through law must be determined through a theory
of values. Where legal interference causes sacrifice of values, reliance
should be placed upon other devices of social control. In such cases,
the best that law can hope to do is to safeguard and preserve the kind
of social order in which these other devices can operate with satisfactory results.
Pound was one of the first to emphasize the need of devising an
effective legal apparatus for ascertaining the social facts involved in
law-making and in the process of judicial decisions. He has pointed
to the work of European ministries of justice in this direction and
has recommended similar agencies in the United States as a possible
41
means of rectifying the present wasteful and ineffective systems.
Such ministries of justice or similar agencies would undertake the
sorely needed study of the functioning of our legal institutions, the
application and enforcement of law in order to discover reasons for
the failure of law to do adequate justice, and would attempt to devise
means for meeting new situations which constantly arise.42 Such an
agency, it is expected, would also furnish intelligent guidance to those
who make and to those who administer our laws.
Pound has demonstrated the significant change which has come
over contemporary society, whereby Sir Henry Maine's famous formula
40. Pound, Cooperation in Enforcement of Law (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 9, (1930)
CALIF. BA Ass'N REx. 63; Criminal Jistice and the American. City in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVE AND (1922) Pt. VIII; What Can Law Schools Do for Criminal
Justice? (1927) I2 IowA L. REV. io5, 6 Am. L. SCHOOL REV. 127; The Adminisitra-

tion of Justice in the Modern City (1913) 26 HARv. L. REV. 3o2; The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (i9o6) 40 Am. L. REV.
729, 14 Am. LAWYER 455, 29 A. B. A. REP. 395; The Etiquette of Justice (i9o8) 3
NEE. BAR Ass'N PROC. 231 and, in general, CRiMiNAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930).
41. Dean Pound regards such a ministry "needful as it is" nevertheless, "a long
way off." "It is out of line with the genius of English-speaking peoples. . . . Moreover, the public would be likely to assume that the work of such ministries would be
vitiated by politics, and without the confidence of the public they could achieve little."
Pound, What Use Cat; Be Mazde of Judicial Statistics (1933) 12 OR& L. REv. 89, 95.
The most eloquent plea for a Ministry of' justice in this country has been made by
Mr. justice Cardozo, A Ministry of Justie (1921) 35 HAv. L. REV. 113.
42. For a trenchant criticism of some current methods of gathering factual data
about these matters, see Pound, What Use Can, Be Made of Judicial Statistics (1933)
12 ORE. L. REV. 89.
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"from status to contract" 4 has been undermined and a new relational
scheme, a "new feudal system" has resulted in which "status" again
44
has come to be an honored concept.
To him, one of the most promising opportunities of legal science
lies in the effort it should and must make to direct creative effort
toward new methods, new precepts and new machinery for preventive
justice. While Pound states that good work has been done through
juvenile courts and administrative agencies for probation and parole,
for the most part, accomplishments of preventive justice in criminal
law are wrought by extra-legal agencies. In the field of civil law the
development of preventive justice has progressed more satisfactorily;
yet even here study of its possibilities has only commenced.
As a result of our emergence from the simple, pioneer, agricultural society of the past, there exists the colossal problem of individualizing the application of law to meet the needs of a complex industrial,'
urban society. Rules were adequate to serve the demands of justice
in a community where points of contact between men were relatively
few, but in the great urban centers of today, when individual claims
conflict and overlap, delicate discriminations become necessary. These
cannot be achieved readily through the medium of rules. This demand
for individualization of treatment 45 has resulted in the rapid multiplitation of administrative boards. Whereas much of the traditional
legal science of the past denied all else save the logical application of
clearly defined precepts, contemporary juristic thought recognizes the
desirability and the need of an administrative element in the legal
46
system.
43. "If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to
signify those personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions
as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Pollock's ed. i9o6) 174.
44. Pound, The New Feudalism (193o) 16 A. B. A. J. 553; The New Feudal
System (193o) ig Ky. L. J. I; (193o) Ky. BAR Ass'x REP. 89, 35 Com. L. J. 397;
A FeudalPrinciple in Mfodern Law (1914) 25 INT. J. OF ETzics I. Cf. Pound's earlier
article, Liberty of Contract (igog) 18 YALE L. J. 454. See also CoHEN, The Basis of
Contract in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (933)
69 reprinted from (1933) 46 HARV.
L. REV. 553.
45. Pound has drawn an analogy to medical treatment. He points out that the
medical practitioner today is more given to the treatment of individual patients than
to the treatment of categorical diseases. In the field of law, he argues, individualization of treatment is equally desirable. "It is no more possible to treat negligence in
the abstract than rheumatism in the abstract." The Theory of JudicialDecision (1923)
36 HAav. L. REV. 802. It is likely that Pound is following SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (Jastrow's trans. 1911) 8, io, who characterizes the
classical theory of criminal law as seeming somewhat as if a physician were to maintain that there are only diseases and no patients.
46. Pound, Growth of Adiniwirtrative Justice (1924) 2 Wis. L. REv. 321. In his
earlier writing Pound was much less willing to admit the desirability of having the
administrative element play a prominent part in the legal order. See Executive Justice
(9o7)
55 Am. L. REG. 137; Juslice According to Law (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 696,
(1914) 14 id at 103; The Revival of Personal Government (192o) GA. BAR Ass'N
REP. 118, (1917) 4 N. H. BAR Ass'N PRoc. (N. s.) 13; Administrative Application of
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Much of Pound's effective early work was done in the field of
procedural reform. He has constantly insisted that
"If we demand that our courts do things, we must give them
power to do things-we must set them free to do things .
we must not make the substantive law nugatory by loading the
courts with procedural requirements. We must cease to prescribe
the details of procedure by legislation."

47

His views with regard to the general direction which reform of
judicial procedure should take are best summarized in his four canons.
"i. Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it must be made
subsidiary in the substantive law as a means of making that law
effective in action. That procedure is best which most completely
realizes the substantive law in the actual administration of justice.
2. There should be no such thing as an individual procedural
right-i. e., a recognized absolute claim to a procedural advantage
merely as such.
3. The ideal of mechanical disposition of one narrow issue
or of one simple application for a specific remedy should be replaced by an ideal of complete disposition of entire controversies
in one proceeding in which all the remedies of the legal system are
available in order to give full effect to the substantive rights of
the parties.
4. The ideal of appellate procedure should be not a separate
proceeding in a distinct tribunal but an application for rehearing,
new trial, vacation or modification, as the case may require, made
in the same cause before another branch of the same tribunal." 48
Legal Standards (igig) 44 A. B. A. REP. 445. Compare his very recent pronouncement, For the "Minority Report" (Administrative Law Symposium) (1941) 27 A. B.
A. J. 664.
47. (1933) 17 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 7.
48. PouNi, APPEL.ATE PROCED)URE IN CIVIL CASES (1941); ORGANIZATION OF
COURTS (1940) ; The Canons of ProceduralReform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 541, 543545. See also Cooperation if; Enforcement of Law (931)
17 A. B. A. J. 9; Review
of CHARus E. CLAR:, HANDBOO OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) 38 YALE
L. J. 127; Senator Walsh of Rule Making Power On the Law Side of Federal Practice (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 84 ; Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court
(1927) 13 A. B. A. J. (Pt. 2) 12; Organizationof Courts (1927) 11 J. Am. Jun. Soc.
; Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599, (1927) 163 L. T.
i44, io J. Am. JuD. Soc. 113; Vesting in the Courts the Power to Make Rules Relating to Pleading and Practice (1916) 2 A. B. A. J. 46; Regulation of Judicial Procedure
by Rules of Court (1915) 1o ILL. L. REV. 136; Organization of Courts (with Scott
and Frankfurter) (1915) 3 NEw REPUB. 6o; Defective Judicial Procedure (with
Scott and Frankfurter) (1915) 3 NEv REPUB. 252; Organization of Courts (1914)
MINN. BAR Ass'N PROC. 169, 22 PuILA. LEG. INTELL. IV; Cardinal Priiciples to be
Observed in Reforming Procedure (1912) 75 CENT. L. 3. 150; Reform in Procedure
(911)
72 CENT. L. J. 158; Some Principles of ProceduralReform (1910)
4 ILL. L.
REV. 491; Grundsatze der Prozessreform (Deutsch von A. Mendelssohn-Barthldy)
(I9io) 2 REinIscHE ZETscHn T FiOR ZIvL-um PRoZSSRECHT 498; A Practical
Program of Procedural Reform (1910) 22 GREN BAG 438, (I910) Ii.i BAR Ass'x
PROC. 373; The Etiquette of Justice (1908) 3 NEB. BAR Ass'N REP'. 231; The Causes
of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice (19o6) 40 Am. L. REV.
729, 14 Am. LAWYER 445, 29 A. B. A. RP. 395; A Bibliography of Procedural Refortt, Including Organization of Courts (1920) 5 MASS. L. QUAP. 332, (1917) 11 ILL.
L. REV. 451; The German Movement for Reform in Legal Administration and Procedure (with full bibliography) (i9o8) I BULL. Comp. LAW BUREAUJ A. B. A. 31.
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Of course, the betterment of the American bar has received much
of Pound's thought and effort. He has been thoroughly familiar with
its ills; among the chief of these he has labelled traditional antagonism
of the lawyer to reform. He has essayed, however, an explanation
of the hostile attitude of the layman toward the lawyer. Professional
prestige dictates that the lawyer cease to decry the futility of legislation and that as a lawyer he undertake the careful and studied reform
of the legal system before the public loses patience and lays violent
hands upon the complacent legal order. Pound is, of course, an advocate of the organized bar. For the salvation of the profession, he
looks largely to our university law schools; in them he sees the only
49
unifying agency which is ready to hand.

II.

THE OPINIONS

A. Zones of Certainty and Zones of Discretion
One salient aspect of Pound's philosophy which has received much
attention during the recent years is his insistence upon the recognition
in the law of two areas, the one embracing the law of property and
commercial transactions and the other dealing with the more intimate
problems of human conduct. In the former, certainty born of comparatively rigid rules is deemed desirable; while in the latter, flexibility,
individualization and discretion are to be preferred.50
Pound is perhaps guilty of overstatement when he says "every
promissory note is like any other. Every distribution of assets repeats
the conditions that have recurred since the Statute of Distributions." 51
It may be significant that he has nowhere repeated the idea in such
extremely dogmatic form. Of this Jerome Frank has said: "Fee
simples (interests in real estate) or bills of exchange often come before
the courts owned or claimed by men who have been negligent or
deceitful. An examination of the facts of a case relating to business
49. For Pound's comments on the profession, see The Task of the Anerican
io MINN. L.
20 Iii. L. REv. 439; Lawyers and Legislation (1926)
REV. 454; The Lay Tradition of the Lawyer (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 153; (1914) 12
MICH. L. REv. 672, (1914) N. 3. BA Ass'N REP. 16; The Problems of the Lawyer
(1925) KANS. BAR Ass'Nr 150; The Legal Profession and the Law (1924) OKLA. BAR
Ass'N REP. 179. For his views of the relations that should obtain between the university law school and the profession see What is a Good Legal Education? (1933) 19
A. B. A. J. 627 (with which compare Frank's What Constitutes a Good Legal Education? (1933) 1g A. B. A. J. 723) ; A TASK FOR THE UxIvEsl'Y LAW SCHOOL (1928) ;
The Law School and the Professional Tradition (1925) 24 MICH. L. REV. 156; The
Work of the American Law School (1923) 30 W. VA. L. QuAR. 1, 30 CASE AND
Com. 71; Taught Law (1912) 37 A. B. A. REP. 975, (1912) PRoc. Ass'N Am. LAW
SCHOOLS 22, (1912) 3 Ai. L. ScHOOL REv. 164; Types of Legal Periodicals (1929)
14 IOWA L. REv. 257.
50. Pound's best statement of the division of law into zones of certainty and
zones of flexibility will be found in his INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

Lawyer (1926)

(1922).

51.

POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922)

142.
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transactions often reveals that the case is sui generis." 52 But if Pound
is guilty of making everything like everything else, is not Frank equally
extravagant in insisting that everything is different from everything
else? When Frank says "often", how often does he mean? Many
("often") of these cases may come as sui generis but if most of them
do not, Pound stands uncontroverted. Despite the audacity displayed
in recent years in the collection of judicial statistics, Frank is not likely
to be in a position to show the falsity of Pound's position by an array
of statistical or factual data, or if one prefers, vice-versa. In this
connection it is interesting to recall Professor Llewellyn's comment:
"In its eager attack on the illusion of complete certainty it (LAw AND
THE MODERN MIND) under-emphasized what certainty there is; in its
perception of the importance of particulars it well-nigh denies the
importance of generals. But what of that? Are pathfinders to have
no prerogative of exaggeration?" 53 If pathfinders are to be permitted
some "prerogative of exaggeration", ought not Frank to pardon the
initial exaggeration by Pound on the ground that Pound too was doing
a bit of path-finding-indeed, finding paths upon which Frank might
later tread? 54 A comparison of Pound's opinions dealing with questions of real property law with his opinions in cases wherein strictly
personal relations are involved, seems to indicate that Pound, as judge,
was differentiating between the two types of legal questions in the
court-room quite sometime before he formulated the classification into
a definite tenet of his juristic philosophy.
With respect to Pound's early insistence upon a strict interpretation of the rules in questions involving real property, one may examine
his opinion in Knight v. Denman 55 where he reversed the judgment
of the district court awarding title to certain land to the defendant
upon his plea of adverse possession. In his reversal, Commissioner
Pound's technique is simple. While the facts are set out with care, the
point of focus is not upon them, but upon the rule prescribing the
factors necessary to adverse possession. The opinion does not proceed
upon a possible point of differentiation between the plea of adverse
possession entered by the defendant in the case at bar, and of the one
entered by the litigant who may have entered a similar plea in a preceding case, on a factual basis. On the contrary the technique employed merely asks successively: what are the rules requisite to sustain
a plea of adverse possession? Did the defendant make out a case
52. FRANr, LAW AND THE MODERN MIN

(1930)

209.

53. Law and the Moder Mind: A Symposium (93)
31 ColT L. REv. 82.
54. Sympathetic to Pound's apportionment of the domain of law between the field
of rule and the field of discretion see Dicldnson, Legal Rides: Their Application and
Elaboraion (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1052, IO8O.
55. 64 Neb. 814, 9o N. W. 863 (19o2).
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squarely under those rules? The court below had sustained an instruction to the jury to the effect that, if the owner of lands does not
bring an action against one who wrongfully withholds possession
within ten years after his cause of action accrues, he loses his right to
bring or maintain such action. Pound denied the correctness of the
instruction, observing that the error in giving an incorrect or misleading instruction is not cured by giving other instructions which
state the law correctly where the several instructions are inconsistent
or conflicting. Where the rule governing is so well settled, Pound
held it error for the court not to state definitely the rule that defendant's
"possession must be continuous, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse
during the full period of ten years." 56 An analysis of the case reveals
that justice was achieved.
In Dunn v. Thomas, 57 the plaintiff, a lower riparian owner, was
claiming by virtue of adve:cse user the right to receive water from
defendant's (upper riparian owner's) land. The suit was brought in
igoi; the plaintiff had maintained a ditch on defendant's land ever
since i89o. In 1899, two years before this suit, he had extended the
ditch materially. The lower court had dismissed the petition. In
affirming the decision below, Pound resorted to the expected technique,
i. e., the application of the tests long since established by a rigidly
fixed and formal rule:
"In order to acquire an easement by prescription, the adverse
user must not only be continuous in point of time, but also substantially identical, during the whole statutory period. .

.

. In

consequence, one who seeks to acquire an easement of maintaining
a ditch over another's land by adverse user, must maintain it
without material change of location for the full statutory
period." 5s
The dominance of the fixed rule in property transactions is likewise illustrated in Battelle v. McIntosh 59 which reversed and remanded
a decree dismissing a petition for foreclosure of certain tax liens.
Pound held that the defendants were estopped to question the lien of
the county for taxes and that the plaintiff's assignor became entitled
to assert such lien by reason of payment of the taxes named in the
certificate, on the ground that "The case appears to come squarely
within the well settled rule that one who purchases subject to a lien
can not question its existence or validity in subsequent proceedings." 60
56. Id. at 816, go N. W. 863, 864 (1902).
57. 69 Neb. 683, 96 N. W. i42. (i9O3).
58. Id. at 684, 96 N. W. at 143.

59. 62 Neb. 647, 87 N. W. 361 (igoi).
6o. Id. at 649, 87 N. W. at 362.!. Pound is aided in arriving at his decision in this
case by the facts that: i) not only is the rule announced embodied in the case law of
Nebraska (Arlington Mill and Elevator Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N. W. 677,
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Again the result of the case seems eminently just, for the defendant
had purchased the property in question at a judicial sale, and the tax
in question had been duly certified and deducted in the appraisement
as a lien and, further, while the purchaser had bid somewhat more
than two-thirds of the appraised value of the property, yet his bid was
considerably less than the gross appraised value.
A similar application of definite and certain rules is made in the
case of Davis v. Kelly 61 where the defendant had borrowed two thousand dollars, giving as security for the loan a mortgage upon certain
real estate. When the holder of the mortgage sought to foreclose,
defendant attempted to defeat the foreclosure by claiming the mortgaged house as his homestead at the time of executing the mortgage.
In reversing the lower court which had allowed the exemption claimed,
Pound admits that the rule requiring "occupancy" of the homestead is
sometimes construed to mean "constructive occupancy", 62 but of far
more significance than that admission is his statement with regard to
the method of construing such rules:
"It is true that actual occupancy is not absolutely required in every
case where a homestead is claimed. Nevertheless, occupancy is
the test established by the statute, and it is only through liberal
construction to meet the beneficent ends of the statute that certain
substitutes therefor have been permitted." 63
Again the insistence upon the general rule requiring occupancy
operated satisfactorily, for in this case the claimant and his family
actually lived upon other land belonging to him. The claimant had
said that he and his family did not live upon the premises in which
they claimed a homestead because they were financially unable to furnish the home, but, as a matter of fact, the family did furnish a house
which the husband owned and in which they were then living.
A rigorous application of fixed rule to the field of commercial
transactions occurs in the commissioner's opinion in Baker v. Union
Stock Yards National Bank.64 In that case the bank's indorsee of a
promissory note signed by the defendant, Baker, as accommodation
maker, brought suit upon the note. In affirming a judgment for the
bank, the court summarily stated the rule:
( 898); Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Schwenk, 54 Neb. 657, 74 N. W. 1o63
(1898)), but also in a statute making the possession of a tax certificate presumptive
evidence of the regularity of all prior proceedings (Battelle v. McIntosh, 62 Neb. 647,
650, 87 N. W. 361, 362) ; and 2) there exists a general presumption in favor of official
acts. Ibid.
61. 62 Neb. 642, 87 N. W. 347 (1gO).
62. "Constructive occupancy" is defined in the opinion as temporary absence without abandonment or a bonafide present intent and preparation to occupy followed by
actual occupancy within a reasonable time. Id. at 644, 87 N. W. 347.
63. Ibid.
64. 63 Neb. 8oi, 89 N. W. 269 (1902).
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"That a promissory note was executed by way of accommodation
is a good defense as against the payee, but not as against the
indorsee, from whom money was obtained by virtue thereof, even
though he had notice of the relation of the parties to each other." 65
Here too, just decision attends the application of the rule. In the
Baker case, the indorsee was a corporation and the notice of the relation of the parties to each other was the notice of the corporation's
cashier, one McPherson. The bank had parted with its funds, representing the interests of depositors and stockholders, not McPherson's.
All these opinions present simple problems. The technique by
which they are handled is the technique which seems best adapted to a
field of law which must always find itself subservient to the general
interest in the security of acquisitions and the security of transactions. 66
The employment of this technique in cases involving property and
commercial transactions has been somewhat derisively referred to as
"a slot-machine theory". 67 To thus name the technique does not seem
to detract from the fact that, on the basis of a factual analysis of the
cases involving "property" and "commercial and business transactions"
in the light of the agreed social policy to be served in each instance, the
employment of this technique to that type of controversy seems to
have resulted in the greatest degree of justice demonstrably attainable.
Whether he did so or not, Pound might well have learned the wisdom
of employing rule-technique to these types of cases from his own experience upon the bench. On the other hand, the realist might remind
us that the cases really prove nothing about Pound's technique because
we cannot be certain that any judge decides cases for the reason he
records on paper. Then, too, it may be that these cases, because of
their simple character, do not establish overmuch.
B. The Balancing of Interests
More fundamental in his philosophy than Pound's insistence upon
zones in the law, a zone of certainty and a zone of discretion, is his
65. Id. at 8o5, 89 N. W. at zo. And see Pound's opinion in Roblee v. Union
Stock Yards National Bank, 69 Neb. I8o, 95 N. W. 6I (I9O3), holding that incorporation of a collateral agreement in a promissory note, which requires payment to be made
of uncertain sums at uncertain times before maturity, and thus renders it impossible to
say how much, if anything, will be due at maturity, renders the note non-negotiable
(The uncertainty in the collateral agreement in question was as uncertain as the
yield of milk from the defendant's cowl) The rule which flatly settled matters in the
case is this: "In order to be negotiable, an instrument must bear on its face entire
certainty as to the amount to be paid at maturity, without regard to extrinsic evidence." Id. at 183, 95 N. W. at 62.
66. See PouND, OUTLINES OF LEcrTUREs ON JURiSPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1928) 65;
A Theory of Social Interest (1921) 15 PRoC. Am. SOCIOL. Soc. 16.
67. "In such cases i. e. involving property and commercial or business transac-

tions] the courts should employ judicial slot-machines, the facts being inserted in one
end of the machine and the decision, through the use of mechanical logic, coming out
at the other end."

FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 208.
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recognition that in every justiciable dispute involving a right, the
claims of the litigants are grounded upon the interests which the parties
and the state have in the dispute. That is the point of departure of
Pound's juristic technique, and it is against this fundamental background that the division into the rule-certain and the discretionary
fields is to be made. The eminent critic who spoke of slot-machine
theories spoke from an incomplete understanding of the theory as a
whole. To denounce Pound's argument for certainty in some fields of
the law without taking cognizance of the initial operation in the judging process, the weighing of interests, is to caricature his philosophy
quite unjustly. It is to label Pound's appeal for certainty an appeal
for certitude when it is not that at all. 68 The first operation in the
adjudication of any case is the process of evaluating interests in terms
of the greatest social good. It is true that where interests of property
are dominant upon both sides of the dispute, experience has taught us
that the social good invariably requires certainty. But where interests
of property and interests of human life and liberty clash, under Pound's
theory, if the protective certainty which ordinarily attaches to interests
of property must give way to flexibility and discretion in order to effect
justice, no violence whatever is done to any fixed legal formula. It is
true that black may not always be too clearly separated from white, but
it comes with ill grace from those who glory in legal flux to pronounce
a scheme of classification useless merely because it is not absolutely
rigid or because a specific rule may not work in every situation.
During his years upon the bench, Pound had before him several
cases involving a conflict between claims of individuals and a public
service corporation or a municipality. These afforded excellent opportunities for him to apply his theory of social interests in the solution
of concrete controversies. In one case, 69 the plaintiff applied for an
injunction to restrain the defendant telephone company from mutilating
or injuring trees planted in the street adjacent to her property. The
lower court had given judgment on demurrer, denying the injunction.
Pound, in affirming the district court, concluded that, though the use
of the street for the telephone poles was not ordinary use but an added
burden, although there was an injury, or taking of property, a suit for
damages at law would compensate the plaintiff adequately. In arriving
at his decision it seems clear that he consciously weighed the conflicting
68. Pound would subscribe whole-heartedly to Mr. Justice Holmes' observation
that "Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things
that were not so." Holmes, Natural Law (1918) 32 HARv. L. Rzv. 4o, reprinted in
COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 310, 311, THE DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (Lief ed. 1929) xiii, xiv; and to his other observation "Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law." Truax v. Corrigan (dissenting opinion), 257 U. S. 312, 342 (1921).
69. Bronson v. Albion Telephone Co., 67 Neb. I11, 93 N. W. 201, (193o).
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interests behind the claims asserted and concluded that the unfortunate
circumstance that the telephone poles and wires necessitated removing
a few branches of Lenora Bronson's trees must not interfere with the
interest in the maintenance of efficient telephone service in the community. After making this evaluation, Pound reads the scales thus:
"We do not think public utilities of this kind ought to be suspended until every abutting owner upon the streets or highways
to be used has been duly appeased. If he has been substantially
or appreciably injured, an action at law will ordinarily afford him
full compensation. If he has not, no opportunity for extorting an
unreasonable settlement should be afforded him." 70
In Re Anderson 71 involved a complaint against violation of an
ordinance of the city of Omaha, enacted pursuant to an enabling
statute, which prohibited the circulation and distribution of printed
dodgers, handbills and circulars upon the sidewalks and in other public
places. The ordinance was challenged as unconstitutional because in
contravention of Section 5, Article i of the state constitution, providing that "every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." The court
sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance as a legitimate police
regulation "intended to further the public health and safety by preventing the accumulation of large quantities of waste paper .
which might occasion danger from fire, choke up and obstruct gutters
and catch-basins, and keep the street in an unclean and filthy condition." The commissioner here weighed the individual's interest in his
claim to a right of free speech against the public interest in health and
safety; the balance decidedly favored the public interest. This technique of balancing the conflicting individual and public interests is
implicit in virtually every decision under the police power. Pound
states:
"In all matters within the police power some compromise between
the exigencies of public health and safety and the free exercise of
their rights by individuals must be reached." 72
In Sturdevant v. Farmers and Merchants Bank,73 one Ross, who
was about to bring an action of replevin against Sturdevant Brothers,
70. Id. at 117, 93 N. W. at

203.

71. 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149 (1903).
72. Id. at 689, 96 N. W. at 15o. It is interesting to compare the results of the
balancing of interests by the Supreme Court of the United States (whose result was
so different from that which Pound reached) in Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147
(1939), the effect of which has been to unsettle judicial opinion in all those states
where anti-littering ordinances have been sustained with little hesitance as valid exercises of police power. See, among the more interesting comments upon Schneider v.
State, (1940) 53 HARv. L. REV. 487; (194o) 4o CoL. L. REv. 531; (194o) 28 GEO.
L. J. 649, 702; (1940) 24 MINN. L. Rav. 570.
73. 62 Neb. 472, 87 N. W. 156 (19Ol).
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applied to Wood, a lawyer and a director, though having nothing to
do with the active management, of the defendant bank, to furnish
surety upon undertaking an accommodation. Wood referred him to
Armstrong, cashier at the bank, who took an indemnity bond running
to the bank and executed the required undertaking in the bank's name,
signing it "Farmers and Merchants Bank of Rushville, by W. D.
Armstrong, cashier." The sheriff accepted this undertaking and delivered the property to Ross. The trial resulted adversely to Ross.
The property having been sold and the alternative judgment for its
value being unsatisfied, suit was brought on the undertaking. The
district court gave judgment for the defendant bank, and this Pound
affirmed. He argued that the cashier was powerless to obligate the
bank on an undertaking in replevin where the bank had no interest;
that where an obligation is so clearly ultra vires that no one can be
misled, no estoppel arises; and that a bank will only be estopped where
it has acquired and retains property by virtue of the contract. The
technique of balancing interests is evident, and the interest of depositors
and stockholders is found to outweigh the interest of the party accommodated:
"Where so extravagant a liability is incurred without benefit and
as a mere accommodation, the interests of depositors and stockholders have to be taken into account. It would be highly impolitic to permit the money of depositors, placed in a bank on the
faith of its capital, to be imperiled by sanctioning such transactions. If the act is of a nature which public policy, or the very
nature of the corporation, prohibits it from doing, there could be
no ratification." 74
C. Toward a Simplified Procedure
Another important tenet of Pound's philosophy is the need and
wisdom of procedural simplification and reform,7 5 the subordination
of the mere "etiquette of justice" to justice, and the discouragement
of technicality where there is no necessity for it.76 Not until the be-

ginning of Roscoe Pound's academic career was the public supplied
with his systematic exposition, but it is apparent from his opinions that
74. Id.

at 475-6, 87 N. W. at i58. For another illustration of the judicial interest-

balancing technique as employed by Pound on the bench, see Dodge County v. Diers,
69 Neb, 361, 95 N. W. 6o2 (i9o3).
75. "The life of the law is in its enforcement." Pound, The Etiquette of Justice
(19o) 3 PRoC. NEB. BAR Ass'N, 231, 240. Cf. "The Life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience."

HorMEs, THE COMMON LA-w (1881)

1.

76. "Undoubtedly, one cause of the tendency of scientific law to become mechanical
is to be found in the average man's admiration for the ingenious in any direction, his
love of technicality as a manifestation of cleverness, his feeling that law, as a developed institution, ought to have a certain ballast of mysterious technicality." Pound,
The Etiquette of J$wtice (igo8) 3 PRoc. NEB. BaR AsS'N 231, 232.
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as a supreme court commissioner he had already acquired a definite
attitude toward the ills which beset the adjective law.
Lydick v. Chaney 77 serves to illustrate the commissioner's opposition to the type of procedure which insists upon doing by indirection
that which may be more efficiently and more justly done by a direct
method. Lydick as executor for Matthews had submitted his final
report to the county court."s Upon examining his report, the court
found two bequests had not been paid and directed the executor to pay
them. The executor having failed to comply with the order, execution
was levied on his lands. The executor sought to enjoin the levy. The
bill for an injunction was dismissed by the district court; Pound
affirmed the dismissal. He indicated that the legatees had two possible
means of enforcing payment of the bequests, either by decree of execution directly against the executor or by the suit on the executor's
bond. His reason for allowing a direct levy was that to do by indirection what might be directly done was not only unfair to the legatees
but tended to multiply litigation and to delay justice as well. He
disposed of the case simply with the observation:
"But if the liability of the executor may be enforced directly, the
parties ought not to be relegated to a separate action unless the
statute so required. We think the decree of distribution is enforceable by a simpler method wherever the executor is able to
respond." 79

In accordance with the ideal of disposing of a controversy completely, in so far as possible, with one trial, 0 was Pound's inclination
to allow the pleadings to be amended. As a result, where the defendant
was guilty of an omission of essential averments in a cross-petition, it
was held that the omission might be cured by allegations in the answer
which amounted to an admission of facts upon which the right to relief
depends. 81
77. 64 Neb. 288, 89 N. W. 8oi (I9O2).
78. The opinion contains an able and exhaustive exposition of the probate jurisdiction of the county court in Nebraska.
79. 64 Neb. 288, 291, 89 N. W. 8oi, 8o2 (i9o2) ; See also Pound's opinion in Har-

lan County v. Whitney, 65 Neb. io5, go N. W. 993 (i9o2).
8o. "The ideal of mechanical disposition of one narrow issue or of one simple application for a specific remedy should be replaced by an ideal of complete disposition
of entire controversies in one proceeding in which all the remedies of the legal system
are available in order to give full effect to the substantive rights of the parties." Pound,
The Canons of Procedural Reform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 541, 545. Cf. "Only too
frequently in the past have procedural rules been regarded as ends in themselves upon
whose rigid altar has utlimate justice been sacrificed. Having been presented with a
brief, simple set of Rules of Procedure [speaking of the New Federal Rules], they
should be construed as avenues to justice and not dead-end streets without direction
or purpose." Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co. (E. D. N. Y. 1938) 25 F. Supp.
80, 8i.
81. Hargreaves v. Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 88 N. W. 486 (igoi). For other illustrations of Pound's liberal attitude toward permitting the amendment of pleadings,
see Kas v. State, 63 Neb. 58i, 88 N. W. 776 (9o2) and Carson v. Jansen, 65 Neb.
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But like most good things, the privilege of amending may at times
be abused. This Pound recognized. In one case a bank sued the
maker and endorser on a note, and service was had upon the endorser
by leaving a summons at his house in Douglas County. An alias summons issued thereon to Buffalo County was served upon the maker.
The maker appeared and answered to the merits but later set up the
defense of no jurisdiction over his co-defendant for the reason that
the latter was a resident of Illinois and had no residence in Douglas
County at the time of the service of summons. Pound, in affirming
the district court's judgment for the bank, pointed out that while the
defendant might properly raise the defense set up in the amended
answer by answer in conjunction with other defenses, a special appearance being unnecessary, he was, nevertheless, under a duty in such a
case to plead the want of jurisdiction as soon as called upon to answer.
To permit the defense to be raised by amended answer after the court
had prepared to devote itself to the merits, savors of obstruction, frus82
tration and surprise.
In a case where the plaintiff, who had been appointed guardian to
an aged man weak of mind, brought suit to set aside a conveyance of
real estate by his ward to a brother-in-law, and failed to allege
specifically that he had been appointed guardian though the fact
appeared plainly enough, Pound said:
"S6 long as the defect is merely a lack of definiteness and precision in essential allegations, not a complete absence thereof, it
should not be considered at this time." 83
423, 91 N. W. 398 (i9o2),

holding that independent action for an injunction in a

cause already pending is not maintainable where adequate relief may be had by motion
in the original cause. Cf. "The time has gone by when amendments on the trial are
to be viewed with suspicion and granted grudgingly. If it appears that the proposed
amendment tends to bring the real controversy between the parties fairly before the
court, the amendment should always be allowed, opportunity being given to the opposing party to meet it in case of surprise." Winslow, C. J. in Mallon v. Tonn, 163
Wis. 366, 369, i57 N. W. io98, iog (1916). For a generous endorsement of this
attitude toward amending by Judge Clark see his HANDBOOKc OF CODE PLEADING (I28)
511. So many of these procedural decisions of Pound suggest the spirit of the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule i5; see also HOLmzOnF, Nmv FEDERAL
PRoCEDURE AND THE CorneTS (1940)

50.

82. Baker v. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank, 63 Neb. 8ox, 89 N. W. 269 (i9o2).

83. Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432, 436, 91 N. W. 409, 410 (19o2). See also
Abbot v. Campbell, 69 Neb. 371, 95 N. W. 591 (903), holding that the word "instrument" imports a writing and hence a verification by an attorney, in an action upon an
instrument for the payment of money only, is not defective because it fails to state expresly hattheinsrumnt
uedon i inwriing "Ntic pladig" as the ideal to be
sougt ideandleanedendrseent
hs rceied
Ths Carksays: "The aim of
pleaing
e tereoreto
shuld
gve easnabe noiceof he leader's case to the
opponent andt to the court. This does not go as far as the technical notice pleading,
since it requires notice of the pleader's entire cause, not merely that he has a claim.
The notice to the court is perhaps the more important, for in general the opponent
knows enough about the case to relieve us of worry about him." -ANDBOOK OF CODE
PLEAIrNG (1928) 30. Sounding a similar note, see Pound, Review of CLRK ON CODE
PLEADING (1928) 38 YAE L. . 127, 129; Report of Special Committee to Suggest
Remedies and Formiulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost of
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In the great majority of his opinions, Pound amply illustrated
that he regarded procedure as the servant and not the master of substantive law.8 4 In Leigh v. Green,8 5 the plaintiff brought an action to
quiet title to certain real estate claiming title on the basis of prior
attachment proceedings. The defendant's claim was based on proceedings more recently ha[ by the foreclosure of tax liens. Since
this proceeding was in rem, the plaintiff contended that the court had
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the land because it was inadequately
described. Although it was evident that the description was wanting
in exactness, it was clear exactly which land was meant, so Pound refused to deny a remedy for that mere breach of etiquette, saying:
"A great many titles depend upon foreclosure proceedings based
on service by publication. If no reasonable person can be misled
by a description, we ought not to imperil titles by criticising it
overminutely." 88
The plaintiff also claimed as a matter of right, that he should have
been personally served and since he had not been so served that he had
been denied due process of law. This Pound denied. He pointed out
that the procedure was anything but summary; it required all proper
persons to be made parties to the suit if known, or due notice to be
published upon showing by affidavit if they were not (as in this case),
and in the proceedings wherein proof is made of levy and sale, any
interested person might intervene:
"The opportunities afforded to all persons affected to make known
their claims are ample. They have no right to lie by and suffer
the taxes to get many years in arrears, without exercising any
diligence to protect their claims." 87
Inasmuch as this procedural claim gave rise to a federal question, the
case was appealed. The United States Supreme Court squarely affirmed
the commissioner's decision.88
Litigation (191o) 35 A. B. A. REP. 614, 618-ig (prepared by Pound), suggesting that
the other functions of pleading, so far as they should be retained, will be at least as
well served as now; Pound, Some Principlesof Procedural Reform (1910) 4 ILL. L.
REV. 388, 491, 497; Sunderland, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915 (1916) 14
MicH. L. REV. 551; Note, Some Difficulties of Code Pleading (191o) 8 MiCH. L. REV.
400; Whitier, Notice Pleading (O1I8) 31 HAv. L. REv. 501; Judge Gilbert and Illinois

PleadingReform (I9O9) 4 ILL. L. REv. 174, 182; Objections to Present Illinwis Plead-

ing With Suggested Remedies (191o) 5 ILL. L. REv. 257; Willis, Proposed Procedural
Reform (1922) 5 ILL. L. QUAR. I7; Logic v. Commvon Sense in Pleading (igi8) 16
Micn. L. REV. 589. On other suggested forms of pleading, see SHIPmAN, CommoN
LAw PLEADING (3rd ed. Ballantine 1923) 9, 10.
84. "Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it must be made subsidiary to the
substantive law as a means of making that law effective in action. That procedure is
best which most completely realizes the substantive law in the actual administration
of justice." Pound, The Canons of ProceduralReformn (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 541,
54385. 64 Neb. 533, 9o N. W. 255 (19o2), aff'd 193 U. S. 79 (19o4).
86. 64 Neb. 533, 540, 541, go N. W. 255, 257 (1902).
87. 64 Neb. 533, 546, go N. W. 255, 26o (igo2).
88. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1904).
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Gibson v. Hammang 89 involved a review of the trial court's refusal to cancel a conveyance of properties procured by undue influence
from an aged widow, much weakened by illness, who lived in a remote
jurisdiction far from her Nebraska properties. The appellee invoked
the rule that the findings of fact of the district court are not to be
disturbed on appeal if there is evidence sufficient to sustain them.
Pound forcefully illustrated his doctrine that procedural rules should
be employed as means and not as ends in themselves. He stated that
this rule is entirely of judicial origin, intended to promote justice by
leaving the determination of questions of fact to those best situated
to reach a sound conclusion. This case was heard almost entirely
upon depositions involving transactions in another state so that the
trial judge did not know the parties or witnesses. The reason of the
rule did not operate on the facts before the court. Since injustice
would result if the rules were allowed to dictate the decision, Pound
held that it was his duty to review the facts and to reach an independent conclusion. He reversed the judgment of the district court. 90
Pound had no sympathy whatever with the attempt by a trial
judge to force the "certain ballast of mysterious technicality," 91 inevitably attaching itself to the pleadings, upon a helpless jury. In
reviewing a case in which the judge instructed the jury upon the question of the burden of proving "the material allegations" of an answer
setting up an affirmative defense, without setting out the issues involved
but merely referring the jury to the pleadings, Pound declared that
"The pleadings are supposed to be drawn in a more or less artificial and technical style, addressed to the understanding of trained
judges. The instructions are supposed to be drawn in a plain,
direct and simple style, addressed to the understanding of laymen.
Hence reference to the pleadings instead of statement of the issues
directly, is considered a reprehensible practice, and may be ground
for reversal unless the error appears to have been without prejudice
in the particular case." 92
To Pound's avowed ideal of a simplified procedure, we may
attribute his judicial construction of statutes so as to minimize,
wherever possible, procedural formalities. In construing a Nebraska
statute which governed probate cases, he declared formal pleadings to
be discretionary rather than mandatory. His decision was justified
by social economy.
8g. 63 Neb. 349, 88 N. W. 5oo (igoi).

go. 63 Neb. 349, 351, 88 N. W. 500, 501 (19o).

gi. Pound, The Etiquette of Justice (19o9) 3 PRoc. NEB. BAR Ass'N 23i, 232.
92. In the immediate case the judgment of the district court was affirmed since
it was deemed that there was no prejudice from the error. Murray v. Burd, 65 Neb.
427, 428, gi N. W. 278, 279 (i9o2).
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"It is well known that the expense incident to administration of
estates is always large. The evident purpose of the statute is to
dispense with formalities wherever reasonably possible, in order
to keep down the costs." 93
Van Every v. Sanders 94 illustrates the satisfactory result which
the technique of balancing interests secured in the determination of the
question: did the plaintiff state a cause of action? This was a suit in
equity to set aside a judgment for alleged fraud whereby the plaintiff
was induced not to make a defense to the action. The plaintiff, however, did not allege that the judgment had operated, or does operate,
or will operate to his injury. The lower court sustained a demurrer.
In affirmance, Pound weighed the interest of the plaintiff in the alleged
violation of his rights against the public interest in discouraging retrial
and review upon mere procedural claims.9 5 He concluded:
"Nothing is better settled than that equity will not interfere with
a judgment on a mere showing of a nominal or technical violation
of plaintiff's rights. .

.

. In consequence it would seem clear

that a petition for relief against a judgment, which goes no further
than to allege the rendition thereof, without stating its nature or
setting forth facts showing that it operates or might operate to the
prejudice of the plaintiff in some substantial particular, does not
state a cause of action." 96
Illustrative of Pound's conviction that there should be no such
thing as an individual procedural right, i. e., a recognized absolute claim
to a procedural advantage merely as such, 97 is his decision that a
grantee of real estate should not be estopped by the mere words of a
conveyance from asserting the invalidity of an apparent lien existing
at the date of the transfer. He argued that
"'incumbrances' meant valid incumbrances, and the covenants and
recitals in their deed (lid not preclude them from insisting that
the assessment in question had no legal standing as a charge upon
the property." 98
93. Estate of Fitzgerald v. Union Savings Bank, 65 Neb. 97, IOI, 90 N. W. 995,
996 (19o2).
94. 69 Neb. 509, 95 N. W. 870 (1903).
95. Cf. ". . . it should be for the court, in its discretion, not for the parties to

vindicate the rules of procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly despatch
of business, the saving of public time, and the maintenance of the dignity of tribunals;
and that exercise of judicial discretion in such cases should be reviewable only for
prejudicial abuse." Pound, The Catons of ProceduralReform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J.
541, 54496. 69 Neb. 509, 510, 95 N. W. 870 (19o3).

97. See Pound, The Canons of Procedural Reform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 54I,
544; Some Principles of Procedural Reform (91o) 4 IL. L. REv. 491, 505.
98. Batty v. City of Hastings,. 63 Neb. 26, 3o, 88 N. W. 139 (1901).
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In accord with the same conviction is the commissioner's opinion in
Stewart v. Rosengrer.99 In that case the plaintiff, a lawyer, brought
an action in Lancaster county against his client Rosengren, a resident
of Saunders county, upon a contract. He joined Anderson, another
client who lived in Lancaster county, as party defendant. While the
plaintiff had separate and distinct causes of action against each, he had
definitely assured Anderson "not to worry". In indicating that Anderson was a mere nominal defendant, having been joined collusively for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over Rosengren and that there
was no identity of obligation, Pound observed that the entire purpose
of the code provision governing jurisdiction would be defeated if
"jurisdiction over residents of other counties may be obtained in actions upon contracts by the easy device of misjoinder of causes of
action," that "such a course savors too much of fictitious proceedings
by ac etiam and latitat for a modern court," and that "courts are instituted to try actual controversies and have no time to waste on moot
causes or fictitious proceedings." 100
In his later writing Pound has often paid deference to Dean Wigmore's felicitous phrase, "the sporting theory of justice" 101 only to
0 2
deprecate much of the undesirable practice that the phrase embraces,.
Even during his days on the bench he spoke in this vein. In holding
that a deposition regularly taken and filed in a cause but not used by
the party taking it may be offered and read by the other party whether
he participated in taking it or not, he declared:
"The common law originally was very strict in confining each
party to his own means of proof, and, as it has been expressed,
regarded a trial as a cock-fight, wherein he won whose advocate
was the gamest bird with the longest spurs. But we have come
to take a more liberal view and have done away with most of those
features of trials which gave rise to that reproach." 103
9. 66 Neb. 445, 9z N. W. 586 (19o2).
ioo. Id. at 447, 448, 450, 92 N. W. at 587, 588.
iOI. Quoted in PoUND, CnIUNAL JusTIcE n AmEmucA (I93O) 163. Cf. "Mr.
Healy in the course of the argument made an allusion to the struggle between advocates in Court as a game. He complained that something said or done was 'not
cricket', 'was not playing the game' . . . I think it more dignified and more illuminative to take the analogy of a struggle of war, in which each contestant relies not
merely on the troops he can bring into the field, but also on the strategy with which
they are handled." Dodd, J., in Flanagan v. Fahy, [1918] 2 Ir. R. 361, 373, and,
".. . the judge must cease to be merely an umpire at the game of litigation. Often
he is little more. This, to be sure, is in part the continuance of a tradition, inherited
from the spirit of gentlemanly sportsmanship which dominated the administration of
British justice. But it has been intensified, instead of lessened, by the spirit of strenuous struggle and unrestrained persistence which drives the bar of our country to wage
their contests to the extreme of technicality." WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2nd. ed. 1923)
209. 102.
PoUND, CPIINAL JusTICE in AMERICA (I93O)
163 et seq. and his many articles on procedural reform.
io3. Ulrich v. McConaughey, 63 Neb. 10, 20, 88 N. W. i5o, I4

(igoi).
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D. Toward a Better Bar
Even as a judge, Pound had begun his crusade for a careful,
capable and thoroughly trained bar. One finds numerous opinions in
which he does not hesitate to call counsel severely to task for lack of
care and deligence in preparing the pleadings or for failure adequately
to comprehend the issues in order to place them before the court. The
following statement is typical:
"We have stated the difficulties involved in an endeavor to ascertain what rulings are to be reviewed with some detail, because
such cases come before us much too often. Counsel are retained
and paid to present their clients' cases in such form that this court
may know wherein their rights have been infringed, and in what
manner. We can not be asked to do their work for them." 104
In one case where plaintiff was suing for the cancellation of a check
given for certain municipal bonds upon which he had bid "subject to
our attorney's opinion as to the legality of the issue," Pound, in sustaining the cancellation, emphasized the point that plaintiff's lawyer
had been subject to a protracted and severe cross-examination
"from which it appeared that he was a young man, of no long
experience in the profession, but trained at a law school of high
standing and possessed of as much experience and practice as
might well be expected under the circumstances." 105
E. The Hierarchy of Precepts
Although Roscoe Pound's hierarchy of legal precepts did not
appear in its completed form until a few years ago, 10 6 it would seem
104. Ketelman v. Chicago Brush Co., 65 Neb. 429, 43o, 91 N. W. 282, 283 (1902).
"We are strongly inclined to think that this case ought to be disposed of summarily,
for lack of assignments of error presenting anything which the court can review."
Pound, in Kingman v. Davis, 63 Neb. 578, 579, 88 N. W. 777, 778 (19o2). "This
cause has given the court a great deal of trouble, because of the condition of the pleadings and the many questions to which the peculiar course by which the issues were
made up has given rise." Pound, in Solt v. Anderson, 67 Neb. 103, 105, 93 N. W.
205 (1903).

Where, on appeal, able counsel had supplanted incompetent counsel below, Pound
felt it his duty not to permit the record to stigmatize the able counsel who had newly
come upon the scene: "It may be proper to say that the able counsel who now appear
for the plaintiff in error seem to have had no part in the proceedings' in the lower
court till after issues had been made up and two trials had been had, and that they
were limited on the third trial to the issue as to the value of the stock. We presume
that some of the points presented were in a measure, forced upon them." Hargreaves v.
Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 363, 88 N. W. 486, 488 (igol).
lO5. Thurman v. City of Omaha, 64 Neb. 490, 495, 9o N. W. 253, 254 (1902).
Where, on appeal, able counsel had supplanted incompetent counsel below, Pound
felt it his duty not to permit the record to stigmatize the able counsel who had newly
come upon the scene: "It may be proper to say that the able counsel who now appear
for the plaintiff in error seem to have had no part in the proceedings in the lower
court till after issues had been made up and two trials had been had, and that they
were limited on the third trial to the issue as to the value of the stock. We presume
that some of the points presented were in a measure, forced upon them." Hargreaves
v. Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 363, 88 N. W. 486, 488 (19O1).
io6. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Formsin Different System, of Law (933)
7 TULANE L. REV. 475, 482-486, enumerating (i) Rules, (2) Principles, (3) Concep-
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that he was differentiating between certain of these precept elements
in his technique on the bench thirty years before. True, the cases
point only to a distinction between rule and principle, for which almost
no originality can be claimed. But it is important that a realization
seems to have begun with Pound at this time of the fact that there were
different forms of precepts, and that the shadowy and blurred areas
lying about "rule" and "precept" called for peculiarly elastic treatment.
At a subsequent date, an articulate nomenclature, which was evolved
as definition, embraced the distinguishing features of the present
hierarchy. In rationalizing this suspicion with regard to the diversity
of the precept element, he realized that law must not and ought not to
be rigidly fixed. In a suit by subsequent stockholders, who had acquired their shares and their interest in the corporation from the alleged
wrongdoers through prior mismanagement, Pound held that the plain10 7
tiff was not in a position to complain of such prior mismanagement.
He saw clearly the value of a technique sufficiently elastic to shift from
one precept form to another in the interests of justice, as the situation
might require.
"To permit persons to recover through the medium of a court of
equity that to which they are not entitled, simply because the
nominal recovery is by a distinct person through whom they receive the whole actual and substantial benefit, and that nominal
person would, in ordinary cases, as representing beneficiaries having a right to recover, be entitled to relief, is a perversion of
equity. It turns principles108 meant to do justice into rules1 0 9
to be administered strictly without regard to the result." 110
tions, (4) Doctrines, (5) Standards.

See p. 296 supra. The hierarchy minus "docTO THE PILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922)
115-120.
The hierarchy of precept forms seems to be on the way but does not quite manage to
acquire articulate statement in The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HARv. L.
trines" appeared in his INTRODUCTION

REV. 940, (1924) 2 CAN. B. REv. 443.
107. "Because the inequitable conduct of Barber shocks the conscience of a chan-

cellor is no reason why he should give his conscience a further shock by allowing
Funkhouser and his associates to recover money to which they have no legal or
equitable claim." Pound, in Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 664, 93 N. W.
1024,

1031

(903).

io8. "They [principles] are not the work of lawmakers nor of courts. They come
from lawyers, usually from writers and teachers, and are best formulated in doctrinal
writing.
"In practice the hierarchy of forms is less likely to be observed in case of principles. Where they come into play choice of starting points is the decisive consideration, and this choice is seldom authoritatively fixed." Pound, H-ierarchy of Sources
and Forhsin. Different Systems of Law (1933) 7 TULANE L. REv. 475, 484.
io9. "These [rules] are precepts attaching a definite detailed legal consequence
to a definite, detailed state of facts. If one likes, they are definite threats of definite,
detailed official action in case of a definite, detailed state of facts." Pound, note lo8
supra at 482.

iio. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 66,
(19o3). Italics added.

93 N. W. 1024, 1033
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In Williams v. Miles 111 Pound observes that principles are that
form of the precept element which serves as the source of rules (in the
narrow sense) :112
"We can not think, and we do not believe this court has ever
understood, that the legislature intended to petrify the common
law, as embodied in judicial decisions at any one time, and set it
up in such inflexible form as a rule of decision. The theory of
our system is that the law consists, not in the actual rules enforced
by decisions of the courts, at any one time, but the principles from
which those rules flow that old principles are applied to new cases,
and the rules resulting from such application are modified from
time to time as changed conditions and new states of fact require." 113
The opinion in Meng v. Coffee 1 4 also illustrates the utility of a
sound understanding of the respective natures of principles and rules
and of their proper perspective in the hierarchy of precepts.
F. Master of the Facts
There are several opinions which demonstrate Pound's tendency
to individualize, where possible, the treatment of a case." 5 In certain
of these decisions his technique has been to describe carefully the fact
situation and then to indicate that these facts constitute a peculiar
situation which in the interests of justice requires that the case be
removed from the scope of a fixed rule; -16 in others to show that the
factual situation may have changed during the time elapsing between
bafirst and second trial; ""3 or in others to insist that a fiction be pierced
and that the stubborn facts which lie behind the fiction be recognized." l8
In numerous opinions, Pound takes cognizance of the economic
conditions of the time, and there seems little doubt but that the eco111. 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903). The opinion contains an exhaustive
study of the law in Nebraska governing subsequent will made and lost. The pointed
criticisms in Pound's opinion are commended by Van Devanter, J., in Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. IOO, 116 (1912).
112. See notes 107 and io8 mtpqa.
113. 68 Neb. 463, 47o, 94 N. W. 705, 7o8 (1903). Italics added.
114. 67 Neb. 500, 93 N. W. 713 (1903).
115. "Analyses and abstract conceptions that serve us well in the legal securing
of interests of substance, where cases are alike and the economic order admits of no
individualization, are vain as anything more than organizings and rationalizings of
experience when applied to the individual human life." Pound, Thw Theory of Judicial
Decis no (1923) 36 HAxv. L. RFv. 940, 945, (1924) 2 CAN. B. R-v. 443, 448. See
also Pound, Introduction to SAL=ILES, THE INDiVmUALIZATION OF PUNISHMEmT
(Jastrow's trans, 1911) xvii.
116. See Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. 811, 814, 96 N. W. 641, 642 (19o3).
117. See Schumacher v. Crane-Churchill Co., 66 Neb. 440, 443, 92 N. W. 6o9,
61o (1902).
118. See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 665, 93 N. W. 1O24, 1O31
(1903).
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nomics of a given situation at times dictated his decision. Boggs v.
Boggs 119 presents a tale familiar enough to those of us who have
watched events since 1929. In that case, Pound refutes the allegation
of undue influence exercised upon a testator by his wife by demonstrating that the testator had in mind a fixed sum which his wife was
to receive at his death and that the depression of 1893 had reduced
his fortune to approximately one-half of its original amount so that, in
order to assure his wife the sum he had long desired her to receive, a
new will eliminating other legatees became necessary. 20 When Pound
was confronted with a case involving a business enterprise about which,
like most jurists, he might be expected to know but little, we find him
mastering the economics and the mechanics of that enterprise. As a
result his opinions include convincing expository essays on public
tax sales and the dilatory procedure of tax collection in Nebraska,: 2 '
the planting, storage, manufacture and marketing of chicory, 22 and
the manufacture of dandruff cure, 123 to mention but a few.

G. The Comparative and Historical Methods
Roscoe Pound's interest in the history and the present application
of principles through a study of comparative legal systems is selfevident. 1 24 One who served contemporaneously with him as a court
commissioner in Nebraska has said that Pound had developed an interest in legal history while on the bench. 1 5 His repeated narration
of the history of the immediate question for adjudication with which
11g. 6z Neb. 274, 87 N. W. 39 (igo,).
12o. Cf. "Whether or not the purchase, earnings and disposition of a roulette
wheel are proper subjects for a court of equity, a partner who, in times of financial
stress, such as prevailed in 1895, absconds with the ready money of the firm and
leaves his copartner to settle the business as best he can, has no standing in a court
of equity to demand an accounting." Pound in Hart v. Dietrich, 69 Neb. 685, 686,
96 N. W. 144, 145 (1903). See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 649, 93
N. W. 1024, 1026 (i9O3).
121. Leavitt v. Mercer Co., 64 Neb. 31, 89 N. W. 426 (19o2).

Bolton v. Nebraska Chicory Co., 69 Neb. 68r, 96 N. W. 148 (1903).
123. Newbro v. Undeland, 69 Neb. 821, 96 N. W. 635 (1903); See also Pound's
opinions in Daugherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N. W. 317 (19o3); German Ins.
Co. v. Shader, 68 Neb. 1, 93 N. W. 972 (igo3) ; Thurman v. City of Omaha, 64 Neb.
122.

49o, go N. W. 253 (1902).

124. His interest in Roman Law and comparative law has spanned his entire
academic career. In i9o6, while still at the University of Nebraska, he published the
first edition of his READINGS iN RomAN LAW (The second edition appeared in 1914xI916) and his appeal for a place for comparative law, not so much in the formal curriculum as an indigenous course, but as an approach to be employed in teaching the
various subjects in the law school curriculum, has been frequently voiced. Pound,
The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum (1934) 8
Recent evidence of his appreciation of the contributions of
TULANE L. REv. 161.
other systems of law to our own may be found in The Influence of the Civil Law in
America (1938) i LA. L. REv. i and The Revival of Comparative Law (1930)
TULANE L. REv. i.

125. Letter from Charles Sumner Lobingier, Esq., to the author.
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his opinions supply us demonstrates the truth of that statement.' 2 6 One
interesting case gave Pound a chance to do research work in the canon
2 7 the bishop sought
law. In Bonocum v. Harrington,1
to compel the
defendant priest to relinquish his parish. The question at issue was
whether the priest was removable at the behest of the bishop as a guest
in the diocese or, because incorporatedtherein, whether he was entitled
to a due hearing. Ordinarily, courts will not review the judgments
or acts of the governing authorities of a religious organization in regard
to internal matters for the purpose of ascertaining their regularity or,
accordance with the discipline and usages of the organization. 128 The
commissioner said:
"We have only to turn to the annotations of our public statute
books to see that scarcely less law is made by construction and
interpretation than by direct legislative enactment. In such a case
as this there would be greater danger that the ideas of the court
would run counter to those of the fathers of the church, and make
laws by construction which were never intentionally adopted.
"Each religious organization must determine its own polity,
and be the judge of its own laws . . . we must not forget that

contentious methods of investigation are largely English, that the
Roman system, from which the church has derived its procedure,
has always been and still is to a large degree inquisitorial.
We must not forget that ideas and methods which seem strange
to us are often older than those which, from familiarity, we are
prone to think part of the order of nature." 129
Accordingly, the court affirmed the finding of the Bishop of Lincoln
that the defendant was a guest in the diocese.
Inasmuch as Pound's approach often led him carefully to review
the history and evolution of the law governing the problem at hand,
there were many times when his researches revealed that in the decision
of the controversy before him, he was likely to have an enviable opportunity to remove confusion, to reconcile, distinguish or repudiate conflicting authorities and to fix the Nebraska law governing the question.
In City of Lincoln v. Morrison,130 after reviewing the early English
decisions governing the mingling of trust funds with trustee's general
-assets, he considered three prior Nebraska decisions,' 31 only to overrule
126. An excellent illustration of Pound's historical approach is to be found in his
opinion in Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 47o, 94 N. W. 705, 708 (1903), where
the history of a subsequent will made and lost under both the common law and canon
law is concisely presented.
127. 65 Neb. 831, 91 N. W. 886 (19o2).
128. I HIGH INJUNCTIONS (4th ed. 195o)
§§ 310, 31oa.
129. 65 Neb. 831, 835, 836, 837; 91 N. W. 886, 887, 888 (19o2).
13o. 64 Neb. 822, go N. W. 905 (1902).
131. State v. State Bank of Wahoo, 42 Neb. 896, 61 N. W. 252 (1894); Capital
Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat Bank, 49 Neb. 786, 69 N. W. 115 (1896); State v.
Midland State Bank, 52 Neb. I, 71 N. W. IOli (1897).
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them and to fix the settled doctrine of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
When Pound dealt with the question of the review on appeal of the
trial court's finding of fact, he discovered the precedents in hopeless
confusion. Out of the chaos of Nebraska decisions he brought order
with the characteristic remark:
"Such a condition should not be tolerated, and we think it time
that this subject be re-examined, and a definite settled rule announced." 132
Haskell v. Read 133 gives one an insight into the caution and care with
which Pound followed the craft of constructing precedent. In denying a motion for a rehearing, he discovered that he had overstated a
proposition in general terms. 34 Although the proposition was unnecessary to the disposition of the case, Pound suggested that that particular question be left open, lest it be seized upon in some future
examination of his opinion:
"It sometimes happens that a proposition true enough in respect
of the case in hand, is put in a general form which not only is
broader than the decision to be rendered really requires, but is
open to question in point of law. We think we fell into such an
error in our former opinion in this cause." 133
The American law is indebted to Dean Pound for his contribution
to the law of water rights. 13 His interest in that subject can be traced
to the opinion which he prepared in Meng v. Coffee,137 where he so
ably restated the common law in respect of the rights of riparian
owners. He sketches the history of the doctrine of appropriation, as
contrasted to the common-law rule*of equality among riparian owners,
making a thorough survey of the application of the two rules in arid
and semi-arid states, and in states having both amply-watered areas
and semi-arid areas, such as Nebraska. The Meng case served to remove the confusion existing in the minds of many with respect to the
law of water rights in Nebraska. Again, the opinion is a fine example
132. Faulkner v. Simms, 68 Neb.

299, 301, 94 N. W. 113 (1903).
ioo7 (19o3).
134. The "over-statement" follows: "Where a corporation has a fixed capital
stock, divided into a definite number of shares, a majority of all the shares is necessary to a valid election, in the absence of some rule to the contrary." Haskell v.
Read, 68 Neb. io7, 114, 93 N. W. 997, 999 (I9O3).
135. 68 Neb. Io7, I15-HI6, 96 N. W. 1007 (1903).

133. 68 Neb. 107, 15, 96 N. W.

136. See POUND, OULINIE OF COURSE IN THE LAW OF IRRIGATION (2d ed. I912);
IRRIGATION LAW (2d ed. 1913) (ist ed. in 5 Am. LAW AND PROC. 363 (1910));
Book Review, S. C. Wiel's Water Rights in the Western States (1912) 25 HARV.
L. REv. 673; Book Review, Geo. F. Swain's Conversion of Water by Storage (915)

28 HARv. L. REv. 824.

137. 67 Neb. 500, 93 N. W. 713 (1903).
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of Pound's ability to draw his conclusion from an exhaustive survey
of the historical evolution of the law governing his problem.
III. AFTERGLOW

One cannot turn to the judicial opinions of Roscoe Pound and
dearly read in them the tenets of his Sociological Jurisprudence as
one finds them expounded in his later juristic writings. But one may
discover in the opinions the way in which he took problems as they
came before him for adjudication and in their solution experimented
with techniques which later he was to formulate for the guidance of
others: the techniques of weighing and evaluating interests, of subordinating procedure to substance, of assessing the conflicting demands
for rule and discretion, for certainty and flux in the legal order, of
taking cognizance of social and economic conditions, of utilizing the
good in other legal systems and of drawing upon the resources of
history. The cases which came before him were of little consequence
as celebrated controversies of the law, but in each case he attempted,
to effect justice by a thorough study of the problem. He was a good
judge. To him every problem was sufficiently important to merit the
best that he could give.
Since Pound graced the bench, the tasks and problems of the
judicial office have multiplied; the transition from an agricultural to
an industrial economy has been accelerated. Litigation in Nebraska
88
has been profoundly changed by such intrusions as the automobile.
Yet, for Pound, whether consciously or quite by accident, his years
upon the bench served as an experimental laboratory for the philosophy,
the method and the dynamic which he was later to recommend to all
who follow the lawyer's craft. He, like the judges of the formative
era of our law, did not believe that it was "psychologically impossible
to decide objectively and impartially." 139
It is the writer's belief that Roscoe Pound, as a judge, visibly
demonstrated the virtues of his philosophy. But Pound worked upon
'simple materials and his court sat in a society not far removed from
the pioneer. It is to be remembered that, when, in later life, Roscoe
Pound speaks of the relationship between law and morals, he deals
with them as two separate and distinct disciplines. He does not regard
138. This Pound appreciates.
J. 731.

See The Judicial Office Today (x939) 25 A. B. A.

139. "The judges of the formalive era of our law did great things because they
believed they could do great things. They did not hold it psychologically impossible
to decide objectively and impartially. They did not conceive that they were of necessity only the mouth pieces of an economically or socially dominant class nor that in
the nature of things valid judgments were impossible, justice was a superstition or
pious fiction, and reason a camouflage for prejudice." Id. at 737.
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morals as a body of precepts or principles which controls all human
activity of which law is but a phase. While he tells us that morals
suggest to law the ends it should pursue, apparently morals do not
control law in the pursuit of those ends. 140 That is dangerous doctrine, for what is not moral is, at best, unmoral. If Pound were
sitting as judge today, it may be that his failure to identify completely
the moral with the legal might lead to unfortunate decisions paving
the way for some of the very things against which he himself protests
1 41
and which he fears.

14o. LAW

AND

MORALS (2d ed.

1926)

io6.

Recently Roscoe Pound has put it:

"If as lawyers must, we look at law, in all of its senses, functionally with respect to its
end, as that end is at bottom the end of social control, our science of law cannot be
self-sufficient. Ethics has to do with another great agency of social control covering
much of the ground covered by the legal order and having much to tell us as to what
legal precepts ought to be and ought to bring about." (Italics added). My PHILOsOPHaY OF LAW: CREuos or SixTEEN, Am.IERcAN SCHOLARS (1941) 252. Why not "all"

instead of "much"'? In his

CONTEMPORARY Juarsvic THEORY (0940)

43, Pound says

"Good and bad are irrelevant to questions of physics. They go to the root of tiurny
things in the social sciences." (Italics added). Do they not go to the root of all
things in the social sciences? Even though there be things "indifferent" in the social
sciences, they will not in any wise suffer because judged against objective standards
of "good" and "bad".
141. Pound himself has grouped these tendencies, conditions and possibilities
under the appropriate head, "The Revival of Absolutism". CONTPORARY JURISTIc
THEORY (1940)
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